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PROTECTING THE FLOCK FROM THE
SHEPHERD: A DUTY OF CARE AND
LICENSING REQUIREMENT FOR CLERGY
COUNSELORS
Counseling pervades our society.' Increased drug use, divorce,
and personal stress have forced more and more people to seek
solace in counseling. In 1957, one out of seven Americans went to
secular and religious counselors, and by 1976 that number had
increased to one out of every four Americans.' As more and more
individuals take advantage of counseling services, researchers have
identified the destructive effects that careless or reckless counseling
can have on counselees. 3 Courts, too, have recognized these destruc-
tive effects and granted counselees legal redress from the negligent
and intentional wrongs of secular therapists under various legal
theories. 4 Moreover, counselees are now petitioning the courts to
impose the same liability on the largest group of counselors in the
country: the clergy.'
' See Siegel, Laws That Help When Therapists Do Harm, STUDENT LAWYER, Dec., 1988, at
33, 34; see also W.A. CLEBSCH & C.R. JAEKLE, THE TRADITION OF PASTORAL CARE 10 (M.
Jacobs ed. 1964) (defines "pastoral care" as helping acts done by Christian persons to heal,
sustain, guide, and reconcile troubled persons whose troubles arise in the context of ultimate
meanings and concerns.)
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary provides a more secular definition of counseling:
"[P]rofessional guidance of the individual by utilizing psychological methods esp. in collecting
case history data, using various techniques of the personal interview, and testing interests
and aptitudes." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 297 (1983).
This note defines "counseling" broadly as conversations or a series of conversations
between a concerned individual or group and a competent carer who uses one or several of
certain religious or scientific disciplines, all with helping intent, C.W. Bars-rea, THE PROMISE
OF COUNSELING 3 (1978).
2 H. CLINEBELL, BASIC TYPES OF PASTORAL CARE & COUNSELING 47 (1984). The author
also notes that, while the percentage of people seeking help from professional therapists
increased from 27 to 49 percent, the percentage of those who sought help from the clergy
declined slightly from 42 to 39 percent. Id. at 47-48.
3 See Bergin & Lambert, The Evaluation of Therapeutic Outcomes, in HANDBOOK OF PSY-
CHOTHERAPY AND BEHAVIOR CHANGE 139, 180 (1978).
4 See, e.g., Cotton v. Katnbly, 101 Mich. App. 537, 538, 30 N.W.2d 627, 629 (1980)
(psychiatrist engaging in sexual relationship with patient held liable for malpractice); Tarasoff
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 431, 551 P.2d 334, 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 20
(1976) (psychiatrist failing to warn third party of dangerous patient held liable for negli-
gence).
5 See, e.g., Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278,	 763
P.2d 948, 952, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1988); Stock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 208, 527
N.E.2d 1235, 1236 (1988).
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Traditionally, a society's religious representatives have pro-
vided moral and emotional support for individuals." Over the last
twenty centuries in Judeo-Christian culture, the clergy has helped
developing, struggling people cope with a broad range of personal
and interpersonal conflicts.' Clergy members often refer to their
counseling as the "cure of souls," emphasizing the attention they
give to the spiritual wholeness of their counselees. 8 Although re-
cently clergy counselors have augmented their focus on faith and
spirit with some of the basic techniques used by secular counselors,
clergy counselors retain their spiritual emphasis and continue to
provide their traditional counseling services.°
Psychiatry, with its focus on a biologically-based understanding
of mental illness, began in the sixteenth century and slowly estab-
liAed its claim to care for the emotional problems of people in the
seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries.'° Secular coun-
seling, as it exists today in the United States, grew out of Freud's
psychoanalytic theory and the vocational-guidance, mental health,
and child-study movements.'' Like religious counselors, secular
counselors attempt to help troubled individuals through a variety
of personal problems. 12 Secular counselors tend to focus more on
the counselee's realization of potential than on his or her spiritual
wholeness, but they share the same basic goal with religious coun-
selors: to heal and guide."
As the demand for secular counselors grew, states moved to
protect their citizens from the destructive effects of untrained coun-
seling by instituting licensing regulations." Licensing requirements
6 See S. STRONG & C. CLAIBORN, CHANGE THROUGH INTERACTION 2-9 (1982).
7 McAllister, Psychiatry and Religion: Yesterday and Today, in PSYCHIATRY, MINISTRY, &
PASTORAL COUNSELING 24-25 (A.W. Sipe & CJ. Rowe ed. 1984); E.B. HOLIFIELD, A HISTORY
OF PASTORAL CARE IN AMERICA 15 (1983).
8 See W.A. CLEBSCH & C.R. JAEKLE, supra note I, at 10. Some scholars, however, assert
that the distinction between the cure of souls and treatment of the mind is impossible to
make. E.g., Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U.L. REV.
163 (1981).
9 Estadt, Pastoral Counseling: Today and Tomorrow, in PSYCHIATRY, MINISTRY & PASTORAL
COUNSELING 41 (A.W. Sipe & C.J. Rowe ed. 1984); H. CLINEBELL, supra note 2, at 47-48.
10 See generally McAllister, supra note 7, at 24-31.
1 ' Estadt, supra note 9, at 41-42.
12 Super, Transition: From Vocational Guidance to Counseling Psychology, in COUNSELING:
READINGS IN THEORY & PRACTICE 9 (1962). The author states that counselors help their
counselees cope with adjustments ranging from severe depression to career choice.
15 See Bloomfield, Religion and Psychotherapy — Friends or Foes?. in FAITH OR FEAR? 71
( Jacobs ed. 1987),
14 See generally Siegel, supra note 1, at 37.
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are not uniform, but most states require that secular counselors
have a graduate level of education in one of the many health care
disciplines in order to ensure a certain level of skill.' 5 These regu-
lations recognize the damage that uneducated counselors can cause
their counselees; nevertheless, all these statutes exempt clergy coun-
selors from licensing.' 6
Courts have recognized this need for protection from the po-
tentially negative outcomes of counseling by holding secular coun-
selors liable for their intentional and negligent torts.'? The coun-
selor-counselee's special relationship creates a duty of care that the
counselor owes the counselee.' 8 Violations of this duty to treat a
counselee according to the profession's standards may result in
liability. ' '`
In contrast, the doctrine of charitable tort immunity and a
general societal deference to the clergy protected churches and their
counselors from liability for their intentional torts. 2° But as the
doctrine of charitable tort immunity has eroded nationally, courts
have begun to recognize several claims against the clergy for inten-
tional torts occurring within the counseling context. Those claims
include defamation, 21 fraud,22 intentional infliction of emotional
distress,23 alienation of affections, 24 invasion of privacy,25 outra-
geous conduct, 26 and tortious interference with contract. 27
So far, however, courts have declined to extend the malpractice
liability found against secular counselors to religious counselors. In
1988, the California Supreme Court in Nally v. Grace Community
Church of the Valley rejected a plaintiff's claim of clergy malpractice
I 5 See id.
1 ' See Siegel, supra note 1, at 37. Although the clergy is the largest group of counselors
in the nation, no state requires them to be licensed. Although psychologists and psychiatrists
must be licensed in all states, other therapists, such as social workers and marital counselors,
are only subject to unevenly-applied licensing and regulation from state to state.
17 See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1983); Tarasoff v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 431, 551 P.2d 334, 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 20 (1976).
Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at '23.
See id. at 437, 439, 551 P.2d at 344, 345, 345-46, 131 Gal, Rptr. at 25, 27,
29 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 895E comment a (1979); PROSSER & KEETON
ON THE. LAW OF TORTS 1069-70 (1984).
21 Hester v, Barnett, 723 S,W.2d 544, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
22 Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 216, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1243-44 (1988).
2 ' Hester, 723 S.W.2d at 560.
71 O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 112 Idaho 472, 475, 733 P.2d 693, 696 (1986); Hester, 723
S.W.2c1 at 554.
25 O'Neil, 112 Idaho at 478-79, 733 P.2d at 699-700; Hester, 723 S.W.2d at 563.
26 See Handley v. Richards, 518 So. 2d 682, 687 (Ala. 1988).
27 Hester, 723 S.W,2d at 564.
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asserted against clergy counselors who had counseled the plaintiffs'
decedent son prior to his suicide. 28 The court reasoned that in this
case the defendant counselors owed no duty of care to the decedent
because no special relationship sufficient to create such a duty ex-
isted between the counselors and the decedent. 29 Thus, no court
has held that religious counselors owe the same duty of care to their
counselees as psychiatrists owe to their patients.
Those opposed to courts extending negligence liability to clergy
counselors claim that the first two clauses of the first amendment
of the United States Constitution prohibit such liability." The first
amendment's first clause, the "establishment" clause, prohibits the
state from inhibiting or promoting any one religion. 3 ' The second
clause, or "free exercise" clause, secures for citizens the absolute
right to believe whatever they want and the limited right to practice
those beliefs as long as they do not infringe on a compelling state
interest." Thus, imposing liability on the clergy for negligent coun-
seling is unconstitutional if it either promotes or prohibits religion,
limits religious belief, or restricts religious conduct without a coun-
tervailing governmental interest."
This note explores the issues resulting from the interaction
among counseling, the clergy, and the Constitution. Section I ex-
amines briefly the importance of counseling, the functions counsel-
ing provides, and the extent and character of religious and secular
counselors' involvement in counseling. 34 Section II considers the
constitutional protections available to clergy counselors. 35 Section
III presents the negligence and intentional tort liability that secular
and religious counselors are subject to." Section IV concludes that,
because the state has an overwhelming interest in protecting indi-
viduals from the harmful effects of negligent counseling, courts
must hold clergy counselors to some duty of care. 37 TherefOre, this
note proposes a comparatively low standard of care, reinforced
through a licensing requirement, which aims to provide protection
28 See Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 290, 763 P.2d
948, 960, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 109 (1988).
29
 Id. at 	 , 763 P.2d at 958, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
39 See Hester, 723 S.W.2d at 553.
91 U.S. CONST. amend. I, el.].
32 U.S. Corm., amend. I, cl. 2; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 303-04 (1940).
33 See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304.
34 See infra notes 39-80 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 81-130 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 131-83 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 184-223 and accompanying text.
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for clergy counselees without violating the Constitution, regardless
of counselors' denominations."
I. COUNSELING
From 1957 to 1976, the percentage of Americans who sought
counseling for their personal problems from both secular and re-
ligious counselors almost doubled." As a result, in recent years
communities have established a national network of mental health
care centers to accommodate individuals seeking help for a wide
range of problems. 4° Undoubtedly, the social chaos and personal
stress of our times help account for the increased demand for
counselors.'" just as assuredly, this demand will continue to increase
as long as those pressures do.
Commentators describe counseling as the art of change and
healing through personal interaction. 42 Through positive commu-
nication, counselors seek to aid the counselee in strengthening re-
lationships with others, developing greater direction and purpose,
and relieving distressing feelings and disabilities. 43 The goal of mod-
ern individual counseling, as counseling developed from psycho-
analytic and vocational guidance theories, is to help counselees with
all types of life adjustments." Clergy counseling, in comparison,
emphasizes particular religious teachings to help the counselee with
" Id
" H. CLINEREIA„ supra note 2, at 47-48. The author cites a study revealing a 31 percent
decrease in consultation of physicians, a 12 percent increase in consultation of psychiatrists
iind psychologists, and a 10 percent increase in consultation of other mental health profes-
sionals.
A national survey done in 1969 indicates that one out of lour Americans felt the need
for help &inn sonic kind of counselor, and that one in seven actually sought that help. Estadt,
.supra note 9, at 40 (citing P. Kim & F. Van Tatelmove, The Ulilizahility of the Pastoral Counseling
Response Scale (PCBS), J. PAsToRAL CARE 81,98 (1981)).
"' H. CLINERELL, supra note 2, at 47. The increase in the number of books and periodic
literature published on the subject of counseling also illustrates die tremendous growth in
the area. J. MCGOWAN & L. 1). Stunt, Cour:snort:: READINGS IN TIIEORY AND PRACTICE
v (1962).
4 1
 11. CLINEIIELL , supra note 2, at 46.
'f E.g., S. STRONG & C. CLAIBORN. supra note 6, at 1.
43 Id. Communication can occur between the counselor and the counselee alone or in a
group. Because of its increased dynamics, group therapy may have inure powerful effects
on the counselee, whether positive or negative, than individual therapy. Id. Still, research
suggests that group therapy outcomes are similar to outcomes in individual therapy, probably
because of the difficulty the therapist will have in getting the group to function cohesively
and therapeutically. Id. at 191-92.
41 Super, .supra note 12, at 9.
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those life adjustments."' Both clergy and secular counseling, how-
ever, focus on helping and guiding troubled individuals as they
struggle through a range of personal problems.'"
Counseling experts whether religious or secular, recognize sev-
eral common elements necessary to heal and guide the counselee. 47
Experts agree that the counselor-counselee relationship is the single
most important factor in successful therapy." Within that relation-
ship, it is essential that the counselor be capable and trained ade-
quately to be understanding, objective, neutral, empathetic, and to
express integrity.'" Both secular and religious counselors must use
these skills within the counseling relationship if therapy is to be
effective.'"
In general, both secular and religious counselors seek the same
result: helping people with their personal deficiencies and inter-
personal conflicts through curative techniques such as listening,
understanding, and empathizing. Secular forms of therapy such as
psychoanalysis, clinical psychology, and counseling psychology, tend
to focus on "realization of potential," "better adjustment," and "in-
dividuation."" Although the numerous schools of secular therapy
" Estadt, supra note 9, at 41-42.
46 McAllister, supra note 7, at '24-25.
Psychologist Elias H. Porter describes at least five different attitudes counselors express
in their attempts to help their counselees. First, a counselor can be evaluative, by expressing
his or her own value judgment of the subject. Second, a counselor can be interpretive, by
explaining the "why" of the counselee's behavior. Third, a counselor can be supportive, by
reassuring the counselee. Fourth, a counselor can be probing, by pushing the counselce for
further communication. Fifth, a counselor can be understanding, by expressing empathy for
the counselee's troubles. Porter also asserts that a counselor can be advising, by suggesting
actions to help the counselee solve his or her problem. H. CLINEBELL, supra note 2 at 93. Id.
" See Bloomfield, supra note 13, al 71.
as Marmor, Psychotherapy: Basic Principles, in PSYCHIATRY, MINISTRY, & PASTORAL COUN-
SELING 52 (AM. Sipe & C.J. Rowe ed. 1984).
4"Id. at 53-54. 'Fri accomplish these basic goals within the counseling relationship, several
specific skills are necessary. Careful listening and observing of non-verbal signals is essential.
See H. CLINERELL, .supra note 2, at 93-94. The counselor must also have the skill to understand
the issues and dynamics of the problems raised. Id. at 94. Effective counselors also use their
skills to show sympathy and understanding through verbal responses. eye contact, or body
expression. Confronting, exploring, encouraging to talk, and inviting clarification are also
common techniques experts consider necessary to establish and execute a healing relation-
ship. See id, at. 93.
Marmor suggests that, in addition to the counselor-counselee relationship, emotional
release, cognitive learning, conditioning, identification, suggestion, and reality testing are
elements necessary and common to all successful helping of a counselce. Marmor, supra note
48, at 52.
5"See Estadt, supra note 9, at 4 I.
51 Se'e Bloomfield, supra note 13, at 71. Clinical psychology is typically concerned with
diagnosing the nature and extent of psychopathology, abnormalities of normal people, ad-
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differ greatly in their specific styles and goals, many therapies do
not consider any theological or existential dimension in their ap-
proaches." Some secular therapists, however, do emphasize values.
But often those values vary from one counselor to the next."
Religious counselors, by contrast, attempt to attend simulta-
neously to the psycho-social and the spiritual dimensions in human
problems. 54 Clergy counseling, more than secular counseling, spec-
Hies behavioral norms, answers specific theological questions, and
develops the counselee's faith, spirit, and relationship with God. 55
Christian clergy refer to this focus on spiritual wholeness as the
"cure of souls."'" Moreover, they see this concentration on the theo-
logical as the essential and distinctive function of religious counsel-
ing.57 The counseling clergy increasingly try to integrate the knowl-
edge and teachings of secular therapies with theology without
sacrificing their special focus on the spiritual. 58 The religious coun-
selor's goal is to learn and use what secular therapies have to offer,
along with the teachings of his or her faith, in order to help coun-
selees with their problems."
Both secular and religious counselors are bound by professional
ethics codes to keep certain counselee communications confiden-
tial.°° In two thirds of the states, psychiatrists are also bound by
justment difficulties, and maladaptive tendencies. Clinical psychology also is concerned with
acceptance and understanding of these tendencies in an effort to modify them. Super, supra
note 12, at 10. Counseling psychology, in contrast, is concerned with the normalities even of
abnormal persons, locating and building on personal resources and adaptive abilities in order
to assist the counselee in making better use of them. Id. at 10.
52 Bloomfield, supra note 13, at 71; Marmot., supra note 48, at 52.
53 Bloomfield, supra note 13, at 71.
" H. CLINFASELL, supra note 2, at 103.
55 Id., at 104, 105.
511 See W. A. CLEBSCII & C.R. JAEKLE, supra note 1, at 10.
57 H. CLINEBELL, supra note 2, at 103.
Estadt, supra note 9, at 41. Sonic scholars feel that it is dangerous to encourage clergy
counselors to receive training in secular counseling techniques. These commentators fear
that emphasis on secular techniques will lead the clergy to neglect the spiritual needs of their
counselees. Id.; see also H. MA LONY, h. NEEDHAM, & S. SOUTHARD, CLERGY MALPRACTICE 18
(1086). See ,renerally A. GODIN, THE PASTOR AS COUNSELOR 7-11 (R. Phillips trans. 1965) (a
discussion of the pro and contra arguments over whether the clergy's traditional counseling
role has lost its identity to psychotherapy); H. CLINEISELL, SUM note 2, at 105-06, (an
excellent summary of this problem facing clergy counselors.)
5" Estadt, supra note 9, at 41,
6" See AMERICAN ASS'N
	
PASTORAL COUNSELORS CODE or ETHICS § III (A lb. AS5'11 of
Pastoral Counselors 1981); AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSN ETItICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSY-
CHOLOGISTS § 5 (The Am. Psychological Ass'n 1981). See generally Bergman, Is the Cloth
Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9 SAN FERN.	 REV, 47, 64-65 (1981),
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statutes that make physician-patient communications privileged. 61
Similar statutes cover patient-psychologist communications.° The
only corresponding statutory privileges that cover the clergy are
restricted to the priest-penitent relationship.63 The privilege applies
only to communications made in confessing sin, and not to com-
munications of other types. 64 More than two thirds of the jurisdic-
tions have such statutes. 65
The confidentiality duty varies slightly from state to state, but
both secular and religious counselors generally are bound to keep
all counselor-counselee communications confidential unless doing
so would endanger specific third parties, or unless the counselee
consents to disclosure.66
 The policy underlying the tradition of con-
fidentiality is to encourage communication, for without communi-
cation the counselor could not do an effective job. 67 Therefore,
states have codified this basic duty to keep counselee communica-
tions confidential.
Confidentiality encourages the communication necessary to
achieve the goal of counseling: actual healing. Although early re-
searchers were not convinced that various counseling techniques
had any positive effect, now they agree that some people benefit
considerably from their therapy experience. 68 Experts attribute the
discrepancy between the modestly positive results of earlier outcome
studies and the more favorable results of later ones to the fact that
the subsequent studies involved more experienced and competent
therapists.69 Positive therapeutic outcomes are closely associated
" 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 820 (1961).
02 Id. at 532-33 (listing state statutes).
"' Id. at 876 (citing judicial decisions from eight states).
c" Id. at 876-77.
"' Id. at 873 (listing state statutes),
"" Bergman, supra note 60, at 64; see e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1030-34 (West 1968);
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PASTORAL COUNSELORS CODE OF ETHICS, Ill E & F; AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS, 5. See infra notes 138-
41 and accompanying text for a discussion of Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,
17 Cal. 3d 425,551 P.2d 334,131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). See also Oates, Keeping Confidences in
Pastoral Counseling, in AN INTRODUCTION TO PASTORAL COUNSELING 87-95 (1959), for a full
discussion of the particular confidentiality issues facing clergy counselors.
"7 See generally, MALONY, NEEDHAM, & SOUTHARD, supra note 58, at 110-22, fur a
discussion of the historical development of, and specific guidelines for, honoring the clergy-
penitent privilege.
68 Bergin & Lambert, supra note 3, at 139-40.
" Id. at 80; see also P. MERENDA & J. ROTEINEY, Evaluating the Effects of Counseling — Eight
Years After, ill COUNSELING: READINGS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 545 (1962) (study that shows
favorable adult attitudes and behaviors resulted from counseling of high school students);
I). CAMPBELL, THE RESULTS OF COUNSELING: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS LATER 1(17 (1965) (findings
of increased academic performance among college students who received counseling).
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with well-trained counselors. The more stable and skilled the coun-
selor, the more effective the therapy." Thus, counseling works —
especially when the counselor is competent.
Conversely, inexperienced or careless counseling may not only
be ineffective, it may be destructive to the counselee. Counseling
can exacerbate a counselee's existing problems or create new ones. 7 '
The negative result of counseling, described as "deterioration ef-
fect," is a serious problem in psychotherapy that is reported in
group, individual, family, and marital counseling. 72 The causes of
deterioration are not all known, but researchers believe that the
therapist's style, skills and attitudes, personality traits, and uncon-
scious motivations can cause negative counseling outcomes." Fur-
thermore, therapists with less training and experience are more
likely to induce deterioration. 74 Thus, therapy has powerful conse-
quences. The goal is health, but the result can be harm if counselors
lack skill or care."
To further the goal of health, licensure for psychiatrists and
psychologists is mandatory in all states. 7° Licensing for counseling
psychologists, for example, is supported by the American Psycho-
logical Association's graduate program accreditation require-
ments. 77 The accreditation process establishes guidelines for the
training of counselors designed to secure a high level of perfor-
mance, integrity, and quality. 78 The accreditation process ensures
that counseling psychologists receive training from qualified faculty,
in quality facilities, through a balanced curriculum." No state, how-
ever, requires clergy members to attain any particular level of skill
in order to practice as counselors. 80
7° Bergin, supra note	 al 180.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 152, 154, 158, 161. Psychologists refer to the counselees who emerge from such
therapy as "casualties." One example of a casualty resulting front the therapy group of an
aggressive, confrontational leader was a subject who was told cryptically by the leader that
she was "on 'he verge of schizophrenia." She was also attacked by other members of the
group. She became obsessed with the leader's remark, and after eight months she still did
not eel she had regained the stability she enjoyed before the therapy began. Id. at 161.
73
 See id.
7' Id.
's Id. at 162.
7" See Siegel, supra note I , at 37. To the detriment of consumers, in many states licensing
of other therapists is often nonexistent, spotty, or not uniform.
77 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ACCREDITATION HANDBOOK i (1986).
7R Id.
79 See id.
9" Siegel, supra note 1, at 37.
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Both pastoral and secular counselors seek to help troubled
individuals cope with a range of problems. Furthermore, both try
to meet the growing demand for mental and spiritual help. Tradi-
tionally, clergy counselors have focused on spiritual care for the
counselee, and they are conscious of the importance of retaining
the spiritual aspect of their therapy. Yet, clergy counselors are also
learning and using skills and knowledge developed by psychologists
and other mental health professionals. Such continued education,
some counselors argue, is necessary in order for both secular and
religious counselors to avoid subjecting their counselees to the
harmful effects of untrained or careless therapy.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR CLERGY COUNSELORS
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
81
The Constitution's framers intended, through the "establish-
ment" and "free exercise" clauses, to allow individuals to worship
as they pleased without government intervention. 82 The establish-
ment clause prohibits the government from aiding or formally es-
U.S. CONS•. amend. I. The Supreme Court has held that both clauses are incorporated
in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and therefore apply to the states.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,15 (1947) (establishment clause incorporated); Can-
twell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S, 296,303 (1940) (free exercise clause incorporated).
82 See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1158-66 (2d ed. 1988). In
Euerson a. Board of Education, the Court discussed the historical forces underlying the devel-
opment of the religion clauses of the first amendment. 330 U.S, I, 8 (1947). The Court
noted that many of the early United States settlers fled the persecution of laws that required
them to support and attend government-sponsored churches. But colonial laws, authorized
by charters from the English crown, established churches that all were required to attend.
Id. The colonial charters also imposed taxes to build and maintain churches. Thus, colonists
found themselves facing in•America the persecution which many had sought refuge from in
the first place. This experience led colonists to the conclusion that individual religious
freedom could best be accomplished under a government restricted from taxing, supporting,
or otherwise assisting religion, as well as restricted from interfering with the religious beliefs
of individuals or groups. Id. See also J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw, 1031-33 (3d ed. 1986). The authors make the point that this popular history of the
purposes behind the first amendment is not so simple and clear. They note that, because the
first amendment was initially only a limitation on the federal government, its inclusion in the
Constitution could be read as an attempt by the states to affirm their sovereignty over the
subject. In support of that point, they offer the evidence that close ties between church and
state existed in the states long after the revolution, and that, even after established churches
had ended in the states, aid to religious entities continued. For example, the authors note,
religious teachers used public schools frequently, and many states exempted churches from
taxes.
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tablishing a religion." The free exercise clause prohibits the gov-
ernment. from proscribing any religious beliefs and requires the
government to accommodate, to some extent, the practice of those
beliefs." Together both clauses secure individuals' religious free-
dom.
For either clause to apply, courts first must determine that the
activity or belief promoted or prohibited is in fact. religious." Courts
have yet to settle on one approach to defining "religion.""" The
United States Supreme Court considers the determination of what
is a "religious" belief or practice a difficult and delicate task with
which the judiciary is ill-equipped to deal. 87 To merit .first amend-
ment protection, the Court has held a belief need not be acceptable,
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others. The Court has
noted, however, that there are claims so bizarre and clearly non-
religious in motivation that they do not qualify for protection. The
Court. has also excluded from protection personal philosophical
beliefs." Thus, the beliefs and activities that qualify as "religious,"
and therefore worthy of first amendment review, are not infinite.•
There is a natural antagonism between the command not to
establish or aid religion and the command not to interfere with its
practice." The free exercise clause and the establishment clause,
therefore, would conflict if read strictly. As an example, the United
States Supreme Court explained that a soldier in the United States
Army could complain that the government's failure to provide a
chaplain to facilitate worship on the army base is a governmental
infringement of that soldier's right to the free exercise of his reli-
gious beliefs. Yet, to provide the funds for a chaplain to be stationed
at the base would be a violation of the establishment clause's pro-
scription from aiding the practice of religion. 9 ' Thus, the two clauses
naturally conflict when applied strictly.
"hi. at 1033.
NA id. at 1067.
"Seri. NowAK, R. RoToNnA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 82, at 1074-75.
5" L. "num, .supra note 82, at 1243.
57 Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714, 715
(1981).
HR Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
59
 The definition of religion 'nay also depend on whether the establishment clause m-
ime exercise clause applies to the claim. The United States District Court for the District or
Arizona explained that when considering establishment clause cases the Court looks to the
majority's concept of the term religion. and when considering free exercise clause cases it
looks . to the minority's. Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 774-75 (1). Ariz. 1963).
1"' J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 82, at 1031.
51 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 309 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Therefore, courts frequently have to choose between compet-
ing values in religion cases. This tension requires that the govern-
ment attempt to achieve only secular goals, and to do so in a reli-
giously neutral manner. Still, situations arise in which the
government has no choice but incidentally to help or hinder reli-
gious practice."' To reconcile these conflicts, the Court has devel-
oped a separate test for each clause to determine when the govern-
ment involvement in religion has exceeded neutrality and achieved
unconstitutionality."'
A. The Establishment Clause
The establishment clause prohibits federal and state govern-
ments from sponsoring, aiding, or formally establishing religion.'"
This clause prohibits the government both from granting aid to any
religion and from showing a preference for religion over non-
religion. 95 The government cannot completely avoid aiding religion
in some manner, however, without violating the free exercise clause:
if the government excepts a certain religion from a law because the
law burdens the free exercise of that religion, that exception may
also be seen as an aid to that religion. 96 The Court has tried to
preserve freedom of religion while avoiding any semblance of es-
tablished religion. 97 To accomplish this, the Court employs a three-
part test to determine whether such incidental aid to religion is
permissible."'
The United States Supreme Court first fully articulated this
three-part test in 1971 in Lemon v. Kurtzman." In Lemon, the Court
invalidated Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes that subsidized
parochial school education. According to the Court, those statutes
violated the establishment clause by excessively entangling the state
with religion. w° In Lemon, the Court reviewed the constitutionality
92
 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & j, YOUNG, supra note 82, at 1031.
95 Id.
" Id. at 1033.
95 Id.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972).
97 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. (164, 672 (1970).
"' J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNG, supra note 82, at 1033. Professor Nowak gives
police and fire protection for churches as an example of this incidental aid. Withholding
such protections would burden churches greatly, possibly in violation of the free exercise
clause. But granting those protections aids the churches.
403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
!Du /d. at 0119, 620, 615. Cf: also Everson v. lid, of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11, 14 (1997) (listing
specific government activities considered violative of the establishment clause.) Prior to Lemon,
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of two state programs.'" In Rhode Island, the state paid a fifteen
percent salary supplement to teachers of secular subjects in private,
parochial schools in which the expenditure-per-pupil was below that
in public schools. Pennsylvania's program reimbursed non-public,
parochial schools for the part of teacher salaries and instructional
materials used in secular subjects.
Finding both state programs invalid, the Court determined
that, although the programs may have had a secular purpose, they
both fostered excessive entanglement between church and state.' 02
Examining the degree of entanglement, the Court started with the
character and purpose of the institutions benefiting from the two
programs and found that the schools were integral parts of the
Catholic church. 103 The schools' atmosphere was religious; there-
fore, the Court noted, religion might be advanced even uninten-
tionally in the secular courses. Next, the Court determined that the
danger of entanglement was enhanced by the particular form of
aid that the state provided. Because the aid went to teachers, not
facilities or materials such as bus service or lunches, the Court
reasoned that excessive regulation would be required to ensure
neutrality in the classroom.'" Finally, the Court determined that a
great number of restrictions, and a monitoring program to enforce
them, would be necessary to ensure that the subsidies were not
aiding religion. The Court found that the result would be a com-
plex, ongoing relationship between church and state. Therefore,
the Court concluded, the programs would require excessive entan-
glement between church and state, violating the establishment
clause.w5
the Court used the "secular purpose and primary effect" test to rule that school programs
of voluntary Bible reading violated the establishment clause because their effect was to aid
the advancement of religion. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222, 223
(1963).
Then, in 1970, the Court upheld a state law exempting the property and income of
religious groups from state taxes. In so holding, the Court added "excessive government
entanglement" to "purpose" and "effect" as factors to be considered in reviewing whether
government was not maintaining its separation from religion. Walz, 397 U.S. at 674. The
Wok Court reasoned that the long history of these exemptions showed no danger of entan-
glement of church and state and no religious purpose or effect. Id. at 680.
' 0 ) Leman, 403 U.S. at 606.
i°2 Id. at 607, 624-25.
i"3 Id. at 616.
"'I Id. at 616-17.
105 Id. at 619, 620. The majority also emphasized the fact that such aid programs would
cause an undue amount of political division along religious lines and that the establishment
clause was meant to eliminate such divisiveness. Id. at 622. But the Court did not clarify
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In reviewing the constitutionality of these two statutes, the
Court set forth a three-pronged test to determine whether the state
action constituted promotion of religion in violation of the estab-
lishment clause.'"" According to the Court, for a state action to
satisfy the test, it must have a secular purpose; its primary effect
must be neither the advancement nor inhibition of religion; and it
must not create an excessive entanglement between government
and religion.
The Lemon Court further stated that, in order to determine
whether the degree of entanglement was "excessive," a court must
consider three more factors: the character and purpose of the in-
stitution benefited; the nature of the aid; and the resulting rela-
tionship between government and religious authorities.'"' A court
could safeguard the goal of government neutrality in religion, the
Court held, only after considering these three factors."
B. The Free Exercise Clause
The free exercise clause grants individuals and groups the
freedom to believe and practice whatever religion they choose. The
clause embraces two concepts: freedom to believe and freedom to
act." The protection of belief is absolute; the protection of conduct
remains subject to regulation for the safety of society."" Accord-
ingly, the Court has determined that the state may not inquire into
the truth or falsity of a particular religious belief, but may require
that belief to be sincerely held."' Furthermore, although the state
may restrict religious conduct, the burden on that conduct must be
incidental, and the state must justify that burden with a compelling
interest." 2
In 1943, the United States Supreme Court confirmed the ab-
solute protection from regulation of belief' in United States v. Ballard,
holding that courts could not examine the truth or falsity of a
whether elimination of political divisiveness was the reason for applying the Lemon test, an
additional element o f that test, or a wholly different test. See id. at 622-23.
" Id. at 612-13.
107 Id. at 615.
" See id. at 620.
mg Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
HO Id. at 303-04.
" 1 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 185 (1965); United Stales v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1943).
" 2 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
July 1989]
	
CLERGY COUNSELORS	 1193
claimant's belief."' In Ballard, the defendants were charged with
fraudulently soliciting donations for their faith-healing church. ) '"
The defendants claimed that they were divine messengers of "Saint
Germain" and teachers of the "I am" movement. They also asserted
that they possessed powers to cure even medically incurable dis-
eases. The indictment charged that the defendants knew these
claims were false and had made them to collect money from their
followers to keep for themselves. The trial court did not instruct
the jury to determine whether the defendants' representations were
true or false. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
defendants' convictions on the grounds that the state never proved
that at least some of the defendants' claims were false.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the free exercise
clause prohibits state inquiry into the truth or falsity of an individ-
ual's religious beliefs.' 1 i In so holding, the Supreme Court reasoned
that freedom of religious belief is basic to a society of free people.
Part of that religious freedom, the Court stated, is to believe what
one cannot prove. No religious freedom would remain, the Court
determined, if people were compelled to prove the verity of their
religious views. The Court asserted that otherwise the result would
be essentially a heresy trial, something the framers sought to elim-
inate with the free exercise clause."" Therefore, the Court con-
113 See 322 U.S. at 86. The basic rule asserting the absolute protection of belief is outlined
in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
111 322 U.S. at 79.
115 Id. at 83, 88.
n" See id. at. 86. In his dissent, J 'mak. .jackson pointed out that, if the Court prohibited
the examination of the truth and falsity of a belief, it must also prohibit the examination or
the sincerity of that belief. He doubted that the former could be clone without inquiry into
the latter. Id. at 92-93. He also contended that such a psychological determination, and the
necessary inquiry into the degree of sincerity, were beyond the powers of a trier of fact. See
id. at 93.
The majority never directly addressed the question of sincerity. The Court has held,
however, t hat it is necessary and within the power of the CAnirt to determine initially whether
a person holds a belief sincerely. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York made such an
initial determination in Stevens v. Berger, 4 28 F. Stipp. 896, 899 (E.I).N,Y. 1977). The Stevens
court, however, did not establish any guidelines fOr determining the sincerity of a religious
belief. In Stevens, welfare recipients objected to a law requiring them to Furnish the social
security numbers of their children. They asserted that, according to their religious belief,
obtaining social security numbers would jeopardize the children's chances of entering heaven.
Id. at 897. The court laid out two threshold requirements: first, that the conviction is sincerely
held, and second, that it is theological, not secular. Id. at 899. Although the Stevens court
enunciated no guidelines to determine sincerity, it relied on a factual determination from
the record that the defendants truly believed what they said they did. See id. at 901-1)5.
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eluded that the government cannot inquire into the truth or falsity
of a religious belief without violating the free exercise clause.
Nevertheless, the free exercise clause does not completely pre-
vent courts from determining whether a belief or practice is in fact
religious, and thereby deserving of constitutional protection) 17
Thus, in 1971 in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the United States Supreme Court
held that a compulsory education law violated Amish Church mem-
bers' free exercise rights. 18 In Yoder, a Wisconsin statute required
citizens to send their children to either public or private school until
the children reached age sixteen. Three Amish parents refused to
send their children to school past the eighth grade. The parents
asserted that the compulsory education statute violated their free
exercise rights because formal education past the eighth grade con-
flicted with their central beliefs in de-emphasizing competitiveness,
worldly influence, and material success.'"
Before making a decision on these free exercise claims, the
Court first had to determine whether the parents' refusal to send
their children to school was based on religious beliefs. 120 This de-
termination was necessary, the Court stated, because the free ex-
ercise clause does not protect personal, philosophical values; a way
of life does not merit protection from state regulation if it is based
on secular considerations. The Court considered several factors
important in ruling that the beliefs were religious, not secular. First,
the Court determined that the beliefs were shared by an organized
group and based on theocratic principles interpreted from religious
literature. Second, the Court found that these beliefs which per-
vaded and regulated the church members' lives had existed for a
substantial period of time."' Thus, the free exercise clause does not
prohibit the Court from examining a person's or group's beliefs to
the extent necessary to define those beliefs as religious or secular.
If the belief is secular, the free exercise clause does not protect it.
If a court determines that a person's belief is in fact religious
and sincerely held, that belief is absolutely protected from regula-
tion. 122 Conduct based on that belief, however, is not.'" Giving free
17 Thomas v, Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713-14
(1981).
'' 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
1" Id. at 210.
120 Id. at 215.
121 Id. at 216-17.
' 22 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
129 Id,
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reign to religious activities would ultimately endanger other mem-
bers of society by exempting religious actors from all laws.' 24 There-
fore, to determine the constitutionality of a regulation of religious
practice, the Court has balanced the burden imposed on religious
activity against the state interest in imposing that burden.' 25 This
balance allows the government to burden substantially the exercise
of religious beliefs if that burden is necessary to achieve, and out-
weighed by, a compelling state interest.' 2"
In 1962 in Sherbert v. Verner, the United States Supreme Court
employed a two-part balancing test to conclude that South Carolina
could not deny a Seventh-day Adventist state unemployment ben-
efits because her religious beliefs prohibited her from working on
Saturdays.' 27 In Sherbert, a member of' the Seventh-clay Adventist
Church was fired by her employer because she refused to work on
Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. The state rejected her claim
for unemployment compensation under the South Carolina Un-
employment. Compensation Act because she failed to accept avail-
able'Saturday work.
The Court held that the state's denial of compensation violated
her free exercise rights. The Court reasoned that the disqualifica-
tion from unemployment benefits imposed a substantial burden on
the free exercise of the claimant's religion because the ruling forced
her to choose between her religion and her job.' 28 The Court then
found that no compelling state interest justified this substantial
infringement because the state presented no evidence that the stat-
ute prevented fraudulent unemployment compensation claims. Fur-
ther, the Court determined that the state failed to demonstrate that
no alternative forms of regulation would combat abuses of the
unemployment system without infringing on first amendment
rights.
Thus, the Court established a two-part test. To strike down a
state action as violative of the free exercise clause, the Court held,
a claimant must show first that the action substantially burdens the
124 See L. TRIBE, supra note 82, at 1243-44.
' 25 J. NOWAK, R. RoTuNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 82, at 1069.
125 Id. at 1069, 1079. The Court dues not distinguish between direct and indirect burdens
on religious conduct. Id. at 1068. As long as the burden is substantial, the Court will balance
it against the state's interest in regulation. A burden is considered substantial when it forces
an individual to forego his or her particular religious conduct. Coercion was first seen as a
separate element for the claimant to prove, but now regulation is deemed coercive as long
as the claimant proves the burden is substantial.
122 374 U.S. 398, 399-400, 403, 409 (1963).
125 Id. at 404.
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practice of his or her religion. If such a burden exists, the Court
will then balance the government interest in regulation against the
burden on free exercise rights. Even if the government interest
justifies infringing on religious practice, the state action will be
unconstitutional unless the burden is no greater than necessary to
promote the government interest.' 29
According to the Supreme Court, a state has a compelling
interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of society.'"
Therefore, once such an interest has been found, it will satisfy the
second prong of the Sherbert test as long as the state shows that its
regulation is no more restrictive than necessary to accomplish the
state's goal.
In light of the Sherbert and Lemon tests, the Court makes three
inquiries to determine whether a state action is valid under the
religion clauses of the first amendment. First, the conduct or belief
to be restricted must be religious. Second, the regulation may not
formally establish a religion, and may only provide aid to religions
if the purpose and primary effect of the aid is secular and the action
does not excessively entangle the government with religion. Third,
the state action may not restrict an individual's beliefs at all, and
may only substantially infringe on his or her practice of those beliefs
if the state interest is compelling and there are no less restrictive
alternative means of furthering that interest.
III. TORT LAW AND COUNSELING: THE DUTY OF CARE
REQUIREMENT
Secular counselors may be held liable for their intentional"'
and negligent torts that occur within the counseling context. 132 A
psychiatrist enjoys a special relationship with his or her patient that
creates a duty of care.'" This duty includes preventing the patient
from harming him or herself or others."' In contrast, clergy coun-
selors may be liable for intentional torts committed against their
' 29 Id. at 403. The Court also mentioned, in dicta, that governmental action that intends
to restrict religious conduct violates the free exercise clause without the necessity of balancing
the interests of the state and the individual or group.
13° Id. at 1083.
191
 See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986); Cotton v. Ratably,
101 Mich. App. 537, 542, 300 N.W.2d 627, 629 (1980).
132 See, e.g., Renal' v. Greenson, 81 Cal. App. 3d 614, 620, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535, 539 (1978).
133
	 v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 931, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 20,
551 P.2d 334, 340 (1976); see also Bellah, 81 Cal. 3d at 620, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
134 Id.
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counselees, but not for negligent counseling.'" Although the free
exercise clause does not protect clergy counselors from liability for
their intentional torts, courts have yet to determine whether negli-
gent clergy counseling deserves constitutional protection.'" Instead,
one court has held that a clergy counselor owes no duty of care to
his or her counselees because he or she has no special relationship
with those counselees.'"
Secular therapists owe a duty of care to their patients. In 1976
in Tarasoff, v. Regents of University of California, the Supreme Court
of California held that a psychologist who knew or should have
known that his patient presented a danger of violence to another
person incurred, through his relationship with the patient, a duty
to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim.'" In Tarasoff,
Prosenjit Poddar was a voluntary outpatient receiving therapy at a
hospital. He informed his therapist that he intended to kill his ex-
girlfriend, Tatiana Tarasoff, when she returned to California. The
therapist directed campus police to confine Poddar but then allowed
his release without warning Tarasoff or her parents of the danger.
Poddar killed Tarasoff shortly after her return.
In holding the therapist liable for negligent failure to protect
the victim, the court first noted that liability does not exist unless
' 35 See, e.g., Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). For both secular
and religious counselors, courts base liability on the fundamental tort concepts of intent. and
duty. Under tort theory, an act is intentional if done for the purpose of causing the harm or
with the actor's knowledge that his or her action is substantially certain to produce the harm.
Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 200, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093 (1955). Four elements determine
liability for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and harm. Duty is the most important ()I'
these four elements; if the actor owes no duty, then he or site is not liable even if the other
three elements are proven. Duty is essentially a question of whether the relationship between
the actor and the victim gives rise to a legal obligation that the actor owes the injured person.
Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 438-39, 254 N.W.2d 759, 765 (1977). Courts will find a
duty where reasonable people would recognize it and agree that it exists. PRossEa & KEETON,
supra note 20, at 359. Changes in society lead to the constant recognition of new duties, and
courts will look at a number of factors to determine whether a duty does or should exist.
Common factors courts consider include the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the
closeness of' connection between defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame, the policy of preventing future harm, the availability of insurance, and the burden
on defendant and society of imposing a duty. A duty can also be assumed by a defendant as
a result of his or her special relationship with a plaintiff. RFISTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS
§§ 315-321) (1965). The ensuing duty may he either to protect the plaintiff or to control his
or her conduct and thus protect third parties. Tarasoff v, Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal.
3d 425, 431, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 20, 551 P.2d 334, 340 (1976); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
Or TORTS § 320.
is" Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, —, 763 P.2d
948, 950, '253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 (1988) (Nally if!).
" 7 Id. at _, 763 P.2(1 at 953-54, 955, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 102-03, 104.
1 " 17 Cal. 3d at 431, l31 Cal. Rptr. at 20, 551 1'.2d at 340.
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the therapist owes a duty of care to the victim)" The court asserted
that legal duties are not static, sacrosanct facts; they are merely
expressions of the policy considerations that lead courts to rule that
a particular plaintiff's interests deserve legal protection from the
defendant's conduct. Further, the court stated, the harm's foresee-
ability is the most important of a number of those considerations
that a court weighs in determining whether to establish a duty in a
particular case.
Even when the harm is foreseeable, the court noted, the duty
to control another's conduct or warn a third person of such conduct
exists only if the defendant, bears some special relationship to either
the dangerous person or the potential victim) 40 The relationship
between a therapist and his or her patient, according to the court,
is one such special relationship sufficient to create a duty. The court
also stated that this duty requires the therapist to take whatever
steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances to protect
the patient's victitn.mt Thus, the court held, by entering into this
relationship with the patient, the therapist becomes sufficiently in-
volved to assume a duty of reasonable Lire to protect, by warning
or other reasonable means, any third person whom the doctor
knows or should know is threatened by the patient.
A psychiatrist treating an outpatient also has the requisite spe-
cial relationship with that patient to owe him or her a duty of care.
Thus, in 1978 in Bellah v. Greenson, the California Court of Appeal
held that a psychiatrist treating a suicidal woman as an outpatient,
with knowledge of the patient's suicidal disposition, had a duty to
take measures to prevent the patient's suicide) 42 In Bellah, a psy-
chiatrist was treating Tammy Bellah for an unspecified period of
time before she killed herself by taking an overdose of pills. While
she was undeiThis care, the psychiatrist concluded that she was
suicidal.
The court First noted that the special relationship between a
psychiatrist and an inpatient creates a duty on both the hospital and
the treating psychiatrist to take preventative measures when suicide
is likely) 43 The Bellah court then reasoned that the relationship
1 " Id, at 433, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22, 551 P.2d at 342.
' 1° Id. at 435, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23, 551 P.2d at 343. But see Davis v. i.him, 124 Mich.
App. 291, 300, 335 N.W.2t1481, 487 (1983) (foresecability alone, without specific relationship,
can he sufficient to create liability).
141 Id. at 431, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20, 551 P.2d at 340.
142 81 Cal. App. 3d 614, 620, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535, 538 (1978).
I , ' id. at 619. 146 Cal. Rpm at 538. See also Meier v. Ross Gen. 1osp., 69 Cal. 2d 420,
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between the doctor and his patient was sufficient to create a duty,
whether the patient lived in or out of the hospital:44 The court
further stated that the duty was different when the patient was not
hospitalized, but that this duty still required the doctor with knowl-
edge of the likelihood of suicide to take preventative steps conso-
nant with good medical practice. Just what those precautionary
measures should be, the court noted, was a question of fact to be
determined at tria1. 145
The Bellah court was careful not to extend the duty to require
that the psychiatrist warn the girl's parents of her suicidal tenden-
cies. The court distinguished the case from Tarasoff on the grounds
that Tarasoff involved harm to a third party, not self-inflicted
harm: 4" The Bellah court reasoned that confidentiality is so impor-
tant to the counselor-counselee relationship that only when the risk
of harm is to others should it be breached. Thus, courts consider the
psychiatrist-patient relationship sufficient to impose a duty on the
psychiatrist. to the patient. That duty does not, however, include
warning third parties of potential self-inflicted harm by the patient.
Like secular counselors, clergy counselors have been held liable
for intentional wrongs committed within the counseling relation-
ship. For example, in 1987 in Hester v. Barnett, the Missouri Court
of Appeals held that a minister who counseled a family, and then
revealed confidences and spread lies about that family, was liable
for those intentional torts: 47 In Hester, a Baptist minister met with
424, 71 Cal, Rptr. 903, 907, 445 1'.2d 519, 524 (1968) (physician and hospital liable in
wrongful death action for failing to lock windows to prevent suicidal patient from jumping
out); Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp., 67 Cal. 2d 465, 469, 62 Cal. Rpm 577, 579-80, 432 P.2d
193, 196 (1967) (hospital liable in wrongful death action for not taking reasonable steps to
prevent suicidal girl from jumping out of open window in hospital ward).
Bellah, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 620, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
' 45 Id. at 620, 146 Cal. Rptr at 538-39.
' 46 Id. at 621, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
"7 723 S.W.2d 544, 564 (Mo. Ct. App, 1987). The Hester court upheld claims for spousal
alienation of affections, defamation, tortious interference with contract, invasion of privacy,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See also Handley v. Richards, 518 So. 2c1 682,
687 (Ala. 1987), rehg denied, 518 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1988) (outrageous conduct upheld as a
cause of' action, but not properly pleaded against minister having sexual affair with family
counselee); O'Neil v, Schuckardt, 112 Idaho 472, 479, 733 P.2d (393, 700 (1986) (invasion of
privacy upheld against clergy counselor for separating family); Bear v. Mennonite Church,
462 Pa. 330; 335, 341 A.2(1 105, 108 (1975) (alienation of affections upheld against clergy
counselors and church for ordering wife and family to shun plaintiff); Carrieri v. Bush, 69
Wash. 2d 536, 544, 419 P.2d 132, 136-37 (1966) (alienation of affections upheld against
clergy counselor for making reckless recommendations or family separation to counselees).
But see Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 210, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (1988) (alienation
of affections and criminal conversation abolished by statute and rejected against clergy family
counselor for engaging in sexual affair with counselee's wife).
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the parents of a family and invited them to confide in him.'" After
the parents admitted that they had disciplinary problems with their
children, the minister offered his family counseling services as a
solution. The minister then not only divulged these confidences,
but also used every opportunity, in print and from the pulpit, to
defame the parents, falsely accusing them of physically and emo-
tionally abusing their children. The minister also harrassed the
Resters' children and employees.
in upholding the nesters' claim for defamation, the court ruled
that the free exercise clause only protects religious — not secular
— belief and conduct.' The court reasoned that the minister's
statements, although delivered in the milieu of religious practice,
were not in good faith religious; his secular purpose was to injure
the nesters' reputations.m The court held that the free exercise
clause does not protect such conduct.''' Thus, clergy counselors can
be held liable for intentionally harming their counselees, because
that intentional misconduct is secular and therefore not protected
by the free exercise clause.
Other courts have found that, even when the conduct in ques-
tion is in fact religious, not secular, clergy counselors may be liable
for their intentional torts. For example, in 1986 in O'Neil v. Schuck-
ardt, the Supreme Court of Idaho held members of a religious
group liable for invading a man's privacy, despite the existence of
"8 Hester, 723 S.W.2d at 550.
"9 Id. at 559. The court did nut find a cause of action for "Ministerial Malpractice" here
because the facts of the case did not permit the plaintiff to allege breach of a professional
duty, but rather the simple duty of care the law imposes on everyone to avoid harming
others. Id, at 554.
ISO Id. at 559. The court, in finding a cause of action for alienation of affections, noted
that even conduct that can be characterized as religious may be subject to governmental
regulation if it poses some substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order. The court
reasoned that intentional interference with the family relationship is exactly the kind of
threat to public safety and order that the law may redress. Id. at 555.
181 Id.; see also Struck v. Pressnetl, 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 209, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1237 (1988).
In Strock, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the first amendment does not protect a clergy
counselor who engaged in sexual activities with the wife of a couple he was counseling. Id.
at 208, 527 N.E.2d at 1236. In Shack, the defendant was a minister and a counselor who
held himself out to the public as trained and able to provide marital counseling. A couple
experiencing marital problems went to him for counseling. During the final three weeks of
a two-month counseling relationship, the counselor had a sexual affair with one of his
counselees: the plaintiff's wife. Reasoning that the counselor's conduct was a clear deviation
from the normal spiritual counseling practices of the Lutheran Church, the court held that
his actions fell outside the scope of the first amendment. Thus, despite the delicacy with
which the courts determine the legitimacy of religious beliefs and practices, some intentional
tom activity is so clearly non-religious that it does not warrant free exercise protection. Id, at
210, 527 N.E.2d at 1238.
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constitutional protections.'" In O'Neil, members of the fundamen-
talist sect Fatima Crusade kept a woman from meeting with her
husband, mistreated her children, and misled both husband and
wife about the status of their marriage.'" The court declared that
there are limits to the free exercise of religion.' 54 The court ruled
that, despite his religious purpose, a minister does not have license
to invade a marriage deliberately.' 55 Good faith and reasonableness,
according to the court, are the essential elements of the qualified
free exercise privilege that religious counselors enjoy. The court
held, then, that a religious counselor may be liable for intentional
disruption of a family because that conduct exceeds the scope of
free exercise protections.
Thus, clergy counselors are liable for their intentional torts,
regardless of their first amendment right to free exercise of religion.
In finding liability, courts may hold that the conduct is secular, and
therefore undeserving of protection: the Constitution does not pro-
tect a clergy counselor's conduct that is clearly unrelated to religious
principles. Courts may also hold clergy counselors liable for inten-
tional wrongs even if the wrongful conduct is prompted by religious
beliefs. In those cases, the interest in protecting individuals from
malicious conduct outweighs a counselor's right to exercise his or
her beliefs freely.
No court, however, has held clergy counselors liable for negli-
gent counseling. For example, in 1987 in Handley v. Richards, the
Supreme Court of Alabama, relying heavily on Hester v. Barnett,
held that where recognized intentional tort theories are available to
provide redress to a plaintiff there is no need to create the redun-
dant remedy of "clergy malpractice."' 5" In Handley, a couple with
marital troubles sought help from their minister. As the counseling
proceeded, the minister began a sexual affair with the wife, and she
began divorce proceedings against her husband. The husband then
killed himself. The administrator of the husband's estate brought a
wrongful death action, alleging that the minister's malpractice or
outrageous conduct during counseling were the proximate causes
of the husband's suicide.'"
152 112 Idaho 472, 475, 733 1'.2d (193, 696 (1986).
'" Id. at 474, 733 P.2d at 695.
154 Id. at 478-79,733 l'.2d at 699-700.
1 " Id. at 475, 733 15.2d at 69(i.
156 518 So. 2c1 682, 685 (Ala. 1987); .see also Strock v. Pressock, 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 212,
527 N.E.2(1 1235, 1239 (1988).
157
 518 So.2(1 at 683.
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In rejecting the claim for "clergy malpractice," the court noted
that malpractice is the violation of a professional standard of care:
the failure to use the degree of skill and learning ordinarily used
by members of the profession under similar circumstancesi's Thus,
the court reasoned, malpractice redresses a different wrong from
ordinary negligence and intentional tort theories. The court then
determined that, in order to be a viable remedy, clergy malpractice
must address incidents of the clergy counseling relationship not
already actionable. The court reasoned that, even assuming the
existence of a professional duty, the conduct complained of only
amounted to a violation of the general duty not to harm others
intentionally. 159 Thus, the court held that when other tort theories
are available to redress alleged wrongs, the tort of clergy malpractice
is not a viable remedy.
One court, however, has gone beyond this narrow holding that
a clergy counselor is not liable for negligence when his or her
conduct may be classified as intentional. In 1988, the Supreme
Court of California held that clergy counselors are not liable for
negligent counseling.'" In Nally v. Grace Community Church of the
Valley (Nally III), the court ruled that there is no special relationship
between clergy counselors and their counselees, and therefore the
counselors owe the counselees no duty of care." In 1973, Kenneth
Nally, decedent son of the plaintiffs, became depressed. He con-
verted to Protestantism and became actively involved in the Grace
Community Church of the Valley between 1974 and 1979. 1 " The
Church employed approximately fifty pastoral counselors who of-
fered formal and informal counseling services to over ten thousand
people in the congregation and a large number of non-members.
Their counseling was essentially religious in nature, and the defen-
dant pastoral counselors held themselves out as competent to treat
a full range of mental illnesses, including suicidal tendencies.'"
i" Id. at 684j85.
Id. at 686.
' 6" Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 
	  763 P.2d
948, 960, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 109-10 (1988).
'"' Id. at 	  763 P.2d at 953-54, 955, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 102-03, 104. In Nally II, the
majority of the California Court of Appeal held that a clergy counselor who has held himself
out as competent to treat serious emotional problems, and who voluntarily established a
counseling relationship with an emotionally disturbed person, has a duty to take appropriate
precautions should that counselee exhibit suicidal tendencies. 194 Cal. App. 3d 1147,
  240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 226 (1987), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rim-.
97 (1984
j62
 Id. at 
	
, 763 11.2d at 950, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
163 Id, at	 763 l'.2d at 950, 965, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 99, 114.
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Kenneth Nally was aware of this self-proclaimed proficiency,
and affirmatively sought informal and formal counseling from the
defendants.'" He made his suicidal thoughts known-to defendant
counselors as he established a strong relationship with defendant
Pastor Cory in 1974 and a "discipling relationship" with defendant
Pastor Rea in 1978. As he became increasingly despondent, Nally
met with Pastor Rea five times in 1978 to discuss his troubles.
In 1979, Nally's mother sent him to two physicians, one of
whom prescribed an antidepressant drug, but neither of whom
referred Nally to a psychiatrist. Soon after, Nally met formally with
defendant Pastor Thomson and mentioned his thoughts of suicide.
In March 1979, Nally tried to kill himself with an overdose of his
antidepressant. When defendant Pastors Rea and MacArthur visited
Kenneth Nally in the hospital, he told them both separately that he
was sorry he had not succeeded in killing himself. The Pastors did
not mention this to anyone on the hospital staff. After a psychiatrist
examined Nally, he was released For outpatient treatment.
Upon release, Nally chose to stay with Pastor MacArthur, who,
after many discussions with Nally, advised him to keep his psychi-
atric appointments and consult a physician. Nally saw the physician,
whose recommendation for involuntary commitment was rejected
by Nally's father. Kenneth then had two additional counseling ses-
sions with Pastor Thomson, in which they discussed suicide. Nally
saw two more physicians, and then Pastor Thomson gave him the
name of a psychologist to see. Nally kept his appointment with the
psychologist and made vague arrangements for therapy, but later
that week, after a family argument, he shot and killed himself.' 65
Nally's parents sued Grace Community Church and Pastors
Rea, Thomson, Gory, and MacArthur for their son's wrongful
death. The Nallys brought suit on three counts: "clergyman mal-
practice," outrageous conduct, and negligence. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the California
Court of Appeal reversed and remanded. On remand, the trial
court granted the defendants' nonsuit motion.' 66 The Court of
Appeal in Nally II reversed again. In stating a cause of action for
clergy counselors' negligent failure to prevent suicide, the court
held that both religious and secular counselors have a duty to refer
suicidal people to psychiatrists or psychologists qualified to prevent
	Id. at	 763 1'.2d at 950, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
	' Id. at	 763 11 ,2d at 952, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
	166 Id. at	 763 1}.2d at 953, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
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suicides. 167 Analogizing to the Bellah court's finding of a special
relationship between a psychiatrist and his patient, the Nally II court
ruled that a clergy counselor's special relationship with his or her
counselee created that duty to refer. Imposing a negligence stan-
dard of care on clergy counselors did not impinge on their free
exercise rights, the court concluded, because the state's compelling
interest in the preservation of life justified the narrowly tailored
burden on religious conduct imposed by tort liability.
Reversing the court of appeal, the Supreme Court of California
ruled only on tort grounds, not constitutional issues.'"8 The Nally
III court held that clergy counselors have no duty to refer their
suicidal counselees to professional therapists.'''`' In reaching that
decision, the court determined that no special relationship existed
between Nally and his counselors. First the court ruled that no
analogous special relationship existed between secular therapists
and their patients.'" Accordingly, the court explained that Bellah
was a simple malpractice claim in which the psychiatrist's duty
stemmed from his professional position, and not from a special
relationship with his patient.' 71 As a result, the Nally III court, stated
that the psychiatrist-outpatient relationship, in and of itself, was not
special. Therefore, the court ruled, Nally's clergy counselors were
not liable for negligence because they did not have a special rela-
tionship with Nally that created a duty of care.
Not only did the court conclude that there was no precedent
for the existence of a duty of care in this case, but it also ruled that
none should be created. 172 In so holding, the court examined several
factors that may warrant the creation of a duty of care even where
no special relationship is found.'" According to the court, the avail-
ability of insurance and the foreseeability of the harm argued for
the creation of a duty in this case. 174 The court, however, deter-
1 " 7 Id, at 	  763 P.2d at 954, 253 Cal. Rpm at 103.
NO Id. at 	
, 763 P.2d at 953, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
169 Nally 111 , 47 Cal. 3t1 at —, 763 13.2d at 958, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
17° Id. at _, 763 1).2(-1 at 956, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
171 Id. at _., 763 P.2d at 958, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
172 Id. at —, 763 P.2d at 960-61, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 109-10,
0, hi. The court listed the following factors to consider in deciding whether to create
an unrecognized special relationship: the foreseeability of the harm, the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered an injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury, the moral blameworthiness of defendants, the policy of preventing
future harm, the burden on the defendant and the community if liability is imposed, and
the availability of insurance for the defendants.
174 Id. at —, 763 P.2d at 959, 960, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 108, 109. The court stated that
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mined that the lack of a causal connection between the counseling
and the suicide and public policy outweighed the first two factors
and tipped the scale against creating a duty of care.'"
First, the court noted that the causal connection between the
defendants' failure to refer Nally to a qualified professional and
Nally's death, despite their knowledge of his thoughts of suicide,
was "tenuous at best."'" In making this determination, the court
examined four groups of facts. The court found that Nally was
examined by five physicians and one psychiatrist after his attempted
suicide. The court then found that his counselors arranged some
of these visits and encouraged Nally to cooperate with the doctors
involved. The court also determined that the treating physician
warned Nally's parents, upon their son's release from the hospital,
that Kenneth remained suicidal and should see a psychiatrist. Fi-
nally, the court explained, Nally's parents rejected advice that Ken-
neth should be institutionalized. From these facts the court con-
cluded that there was no causal connection between the defendants'
actions and Nally's death. Therefore, the court ruled that there was
less reason to create a duty of care in this case.
The court also emphasized that imposing a duty of care on
Nally's clergy counselors would be contrary to several stated public
policies. Counseling in general would suffer, the court declared,
because people in need of help would be reluctant to seek it if they
knew the counselor had a duty to commit them to psychiatric facil-
ities.'" Furthermore, the court stated, neither the legislature nor
the courts had ever imposed a duty to take steps to prevent suicide.
According to the court, imposing the duty here would contravene
a legislative intent to exempt the clergy from licensing requirements
and to encourage private assistance efforts. 17 "
foreseeability of the harm or knowledge of the danger, is insufficient to create a
legally cognizable special relationship giving rise to a legal duty to prevent harm." Id. at
763 P.2d at 959, 253 Cal. Rpm at 108.
The court mentioned briefly the existence of "clergyman malpractice" insurance de-
signed to cover churches for damages caused by the counseling of pastors, but also noted
that the value of such insurance is unknown because so few cases of this type have been filed
against the pastors. Id. at 763 P.2d at 960, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 109; see also Note,
Intentiorud Infliction of Emotional Distress by Spiritual Counselors: Cart Outrageous Conduct Be "Free
Exercise"? 84 Mien. L. REv. 1296, 1300 n.12 (1986).
175 Nally III, 47 Cal. 3d at	 763 P,2d at 959, 960, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 108, 109.
06 Id. at	 763 P.2c1 at 958, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
177 1d. at	 763 P,2d at 959, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
1 " id. at 	 , 763 P.2d at 959-60, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 108-09. The court interpreted
the fact that clergy counselors are not mentioned in statutes requiring the licensing of
marriage, family, domestic, and child counselors as a specific mandate that no such regulation
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Finally, the court emphasized that negligent clergy counseling
would be difficult for the judiciary to assess. Even if it could develop
workable standards of care to assess negligent clergy counseling and
to identify those to whom the duty should apply, the court noted,
the differing theological views of many counselors would make it
impractical to create such a duty.'" These policy concerns, the court
stated, in addition to its finding that no special relationship existed
between Nally and his counselors, led to its not imposing a duty on
clergy counselors to take reasonable steps to prevent a counselee's
suicide: 8"
In a strong concurrence, Justice Kaufman asserted that there
was clear evidence of a legal duty in this case, but no convincing
evidence that such duty had been breached or that the breach
proximately caused Nally's death.' 81 He stated that a special rela-
tionship existed, which led to a duty to recognize the limits of
counselor competence, once symptoms such as suicidal traits were
recognized, and advise the counselee to seek competent professional
medical help. 182 justice Kaufman reasoned that such a minimal duty
would not deter those in need of help from seeking it because no
confidence need be violated. He also noted that the free exercise
clause would not prohibit such a duty because the burden would
not restrict one's belief, would be minimal, and would be out-
weighed by a strong government interest in preserving the lives of
of clergy counseling should exist. Id. The court also looked to the exemption from liability
of first aid volunteers and non-professionals performing CPR, and the abrogation of the
"Good Samaritan" rule, as indications that courts should not hold the clergy liable for
counseling negligently. According to the court, these acts manifest the legislative policy that
holding people in non-custodial, noncommercial, voluntary relationships liable would dis-
courage the giving of this type of aid. Id. at  , 763 P.2d at 960, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
179 Id. at 763 I' 2d at 960, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 109. Here the majority makes its only
mention of the constitutionality of holding clergy counselors liable in negligerice: imposing
a duty would be "quite possibly unconstitutional."
1 " Id. The majority also noted in its conclusion that its opinion did not foreclose imposing
liability on non-therapist counselors who hold themselves out as professionals, for injuries
resulting from the counseling. Id. at   , 763 P.2d at 961 11.8, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110 n.8.
181 Id. at	 , 763 P.2d at 964, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 113 (Kaufman,,., concurring).
182 1d. at 	 , 763 P.2d at 967-68, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 116-17 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
This duty is more specific than that suggested by the court of appeal in Nally II and
rejected by the California Supreme Court in Nally III. See Nally v. Grace Community Church
of the Valley, 194 Cal. Apj• 3d 1147,   , 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 226 (1987), rev'd, 47 Cal.
3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988). In Nally II, the majority concluded that the
clergy counselor's duty, once he has diagnosed a counselee as suicidal, is to place the counselee
in the hands of a professional who is best equipped to save the counselee from suicide. Id.
at 240 Cal. Rptr. at 229. The court did not elaborate on or define the phrase "place
him in the hands of .
	 ." See id. at	 240 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
July 1989]	 CLERGY COUNSELORS	 1207
would-be suicide victims.'" The counselors had met their duty in
this case, he concluded, because they repeatedly had urged Nally
to seek professional psychiatric help.
In sum, both clergy and professional counselors may be held
liable for intentional torts committed in the counseling context.
Psychiatrists also are required to take measures to prevent patients
from foreseeably harming themselves or others. Yet, based on pub-
lic policy and the lack of a special relationship between counselor
and counselee, no court has imposed a similar duty of care on clergy
counselors.
IV. PROTECTING THE PUBLIC FROM NEGLIGENT CLERGY
COUNSELING
Clergy counselors should be subject to liability for negligent
counseling. They also should be licensed to ensure their compe-
tence. Neither the imposition of a duty of care nor a licensing
requirement would violate the first amendment. Furthermore, pub-
lic policy and recognized tort doctrines support establishing a min-
imally burdensome duty of care and a licensing requirement.
Courts should require that clergy counselors who hold them-
selves out as competent to deal with serious emotional illness be
capable of understanding basic psychological problems. Clergy
counselors should also be able to identify these troubles in their
counselees and recognize when they, as counselors, are no longer
competent to treat those counselees. Once clergy counselors have
identified a counselee's problem and found it beyond their level of
competence, courts should require them to refer that counselee to
a professional therapist. This duty to refer would require clergy
counselors only to try to persuade — not to force — a counselee to
contact a professional therapist for treatment. Such a duty of care
would be a minimal burden for clergy counselors.
A basic licensing requirement would ensure that clergy coun-
selors could meet this duty of care. Licensing should merely require
that clergy counselors receive enough training to become competent
to meet the• above duty. Licensing thus should require only that
clergy counselors acquire, through any of a number of available
educational programs, enough understanding of mental health to
be able to identify mental disorders, and realize when and how to
get a counselee to a professional therapist. Such a licensing require-
1 H 3 1(1.	 763 P.2c1 at 969-70,2:6 Cal. Rptr. at 118-19 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
1208	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 30:1179
meat would not be overly burdensome on clergy counselors who
hold themselves out as competent to treat serious mental problems,
and it would reinforce the above duty of care.
Moreover, requiring that certain clergy members be licensed to
conduct counseling and holding them to a minimum duty of care
do not present formidable constitutional problems.'" The mini-
mum duty of care outlined above violates neither the free exercise
nor the establishment clauses of the first amendment. Although
freedom not to have one's religious belief regulated in any way is
absolute, the conduct based on that belief is not afforded such
protection.'" Because clergy counseling constitutes religious con-
duct, not belief, the proposed duty must not infringe on the qual-
ified constitutional right to freedom of religious conduct. In Sherbert
v. Verner, the Supreme Court established a two-part balancing test
to determine whether a state is permissibly regulating religious
conduct.' 86 In Sherbert, the Court held that, if a state action substan-
tially burdens religious practice, then that burden must be out-
weighed by a compelling state interest that is the least restrictive
alternative means of furthering that interest. 187
Under the Sherbert test, imposing negligence liability on clergy
counselors would not violate the free exercise clause. First, the above
duty would not impose a substantial burden on religion.' 88 The
proposed duty is not as substantial as the infringement found in
Sherbert. There the Court ruled that the burden on a Seventh Day
Adventist's religious practice was indirect but substantial because
the state statute put pressure on her to forego that practice — to
As a threshold determination, courts could arguably view counseling as a secular -
activity that does not receive the benefits of the free exercise or establishment clauses. This
view is supported by the recent growth of the secular counselor into the position formerly
dominated by the clergy and the increased use by the clergy of the methods and understand-
ing of therapy researched and used by mental health professionals. These facts indicate that
counseling has become a more secular discipline. This approach to divert constitutional
protection, however, is unlikely to be successful. As practiced by most clergy counselors,
counseling is still based on the spiritual,
Moreover, counseling historically has been the clergy's function. In addition, courts may
find it difficult and even unconstitutional to separate the secular from the spiritual elements
in the content of counsel. Finally, inquiring into the nature of the counseling in an attempt
to identify and separate the religious from the secular could create free exercise problems.
See Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 550 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
"5 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940),
'"" Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
IR7 Id
'" Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Ca1,3d 278, 	 , 763 P.2d
948, 970, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 119 (1988) (Kaufinan, J., concurring).
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choose between her job and her religion. The Court determined
that the result was the equivalent of a monetary fine.' 8')
The duty of care suggested here is not the equivalent of a fine
on clergy counselors, nor does it force them to modify or forego
their religious practice. The suggested standard of care would sim-
ply require certain clergy counselors — those who hold themselves
out as competent to treat serious mental illnesses — to possess
enough knowledge of major mental illnesses to be able to identify
them. Then clergy counselors would merely need to recognize when
they no longer had the knowledge to treat those illnesses and to
know to whom to refer the counselees. As both the majority in Nally
II and the concurrence in Nally III agreed, a duty of care does not
prevent clergy counselors from expressing their religious views in
an effort to aid their counselees.'"" The duty proposed does not
expose clergy counselors to liability for refusing to counsel contrary
to their beliefs or for counseling in conformity with them; it merely
exposes them to liability for failing to meet a standard of care
independent of the content of their counsel.'• 1 Thus, the duty
would burden religious practice only minimally.
In Nally 11, the court conceded that there is one limited instance
in which the burden on religious practice would be more substantial:
when a clergy counselor holds a religious belief that it is wrong For
a counselee to be treated by a professional therapist.'" 2 Such a
burden is similar to that found in Sherbert because that clergy coun-
selor would be forced to choose between his or her belief and
financial liability. Even in such a rare case, the Nally II court con-
cluded, a duty of care is not unconstitutional as a matter of law: it
is an issue of fact whether a particular clergy counselor's religion
actually prohibits such referrals.'`'" Therefore, the proposed duty
imposes a substantial burden on religion only when a counselor's
belief prevents him or her from meeting that duty and when he or
she can prove that at trial.
Yet even if referral is proven to be contrary to a sincerely-held
religious belief, a state has a compelling interest in the mental health
of its citizens that outweighs the corresponding burden on a reli-
"I" Sherbert v. Vertii&, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1063).
	III, 47 Cal. 3d at 	 , 703 l'.2d at 969, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 1 18 ( l988) (Kaufman,
J., concurring); Nally II, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 	  240 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
	' 91 Nally III, 47 Cal. 3d at	 763 P.2d at 969, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 118 (1988) (Kaufman,
J., concurring); Nally II, 194 Cal. App. 3d at	 241) Cal. Rptr. at 234.
192 Nally II, 194 Cal. App. 3d at - 240 Cal. Rptr. at 234
193 id,
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gious counselor. The Sherbert Court ruled that the substantial in-
fringement on religious conduct in that case was not outweighed
by the state's interest in preventing unscrupulous claimants from
filing fraudulent claims of religious objection to Saturday work.'"
The severe harm that negligent counseling can cause is cer-
tainly a more compelling state interest. The demand for counseling
is growing. More and more Americans seek counseling from secular
and religious sources for their many problems. Research now re-
veals that counseling can provide the positive healing that these
individuals seek. Research also reveals, however, that unskilled and
careless counseling can severely harm those who need its help. I f a
counselor is untrained or negligent, the counsel he or she engages
in may not only be ineffective, but it may also exacerbate the coun-
selee's existing mental problems. Because religious counselors con-
stitute the largest group of counselors in the country, the compelling
state interest in preventing such harm cannot be accomplished with-
out holding those counselors responsible for their negligence. As
the concurrence in Nally III and the majority in Nally II both as-
serted, society's interest in preventing a would-be suicide is as pro-
found as its interest in preserving life itself.' 95 Therefore, the state
interest in imposing negligence liability on religious counselors
could not be more compelling; it outweighs any burden on religious
conduct even in the unlikely case that such a burden is substantial.
Moreover, there is no less restrictive alternative that will accom-
plish this compelling goal. In fact, the Nally II majority ruled that
a duty to refer that was even more exacting than the one proposed
here was not only narrowly tailored, but was also the very minimum
required to achieve the state's interest. 19" Such a narrow duty of
care, the court noted, was far less restrictive than a ban on all
religious counseling of suicidal people or a requirement that the
religious counseling given be the best possible to prevent suicide.
Therefore, under the Sherbert test, holding clergy counselors to the
proposed standard of care does not violate the free exercise pro-
tection of religious conduct because the standard is minimally bur-
densome, supported by a compelling state interest, and narrowly
tailored.
One court has suggested that imposing negligence liability on
clergy counselors will ultimately result in state restriction of religious
"" 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
' 95 Id.; Nally II, 199 Cal. App. 3d at 	 , 24 Cal. Rptr. at 239, 235.
' 9" Nally II, 194 Cal, App. 3d at	 24 Cal. Itptr, at 236.
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belief, something the Court has forbidden as a violation of the free
exercise clause. In Hester v. Barnett, the Missouri Court of Appeals
ruled that clergy counselors are not liable for negligent counseling
when a court characterizes their actions as intentional torts. 197 In
dicta, the Hester court noted that negligence liability may implicate
the freedom-to-believe aspect of the free exercise clause.'" Holding
clergy counselors to a duty to use the degree of skill exhibited by
ordinary members of that profession, the court explained, would
involve courts in judging the methods, training, and content of
various types of religious counseling to determine what the "ordi-
nary" member of each would be. The court reasoned that this
inquiry, in turn, might result in an evaluation of the religious beliefs
of different counselors.
The Hester court's dicta, however, does not apply to the stan-
dard of care suggested here. The general negligence duty proposed
would only require courts to determine whether a clergy counselor
held him or herself out as competent, in fact recognized a mental
disorder, and referred the counselee to a professional therapist. It
would not require courts to compare a particular clergy counselor
to the ordinary member of his or her profession. Therefore, no
inquiry into the beliefs of a particular counselor would be necessary
to determine whether his or her beliefs matched those of the or-
dinary clergy counselor. Consequently, neither the free exercise
clause's absolute protection from the regulation of religious belief
nor its qualified prohibition on the restriction of religious conduct
shield clergy counselors from the proposed minimally burdensome
regulation. .
Furthermore, the establishment clause does not prevent the
imposition of a duty of care on religious counselors. In Lemon v.
Kurtzman, the Supreme Court presented a three-prong test to de-
termine whether a state action is unconstitutional under the estab-
lishment clause. 19" Reviewing the constitutionality of two statutes
that attempted to subsidize parochial school education, the Lemon
Court determined that the establishment clause prohibits the gov-
ernment from any regulation that has a religious purpose, results
primarily in the advancement or inhibition of religion, or excessively
entangles the state with religion.
"? Hester v. Barttea, 723 SAV.2c1 594, 553-54 (Mo. Ct.. App. 1987).
ill' Id. at 553.
um Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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Holding church counselors to the proposed standard of care
passes the Lemon test because the purpose is secular, the primary
effect is not advancement or inhibition of religion, and excessive
entanglement does not result. 2°° The purpose of imposing a duty
of care is to protect counselees from the destructive effects of neg-'
ligent therapy. This is a secular, not a religious goal. The Nally II
court agreed that a standard of care serves not only a secular
purpose, but a compelling one. 20 ' The Nally III concurrence also
concluded that the purpose was religiously neutral. 202 Therefore,
the imposition of the suggested duty of care passes the first prong
of the Lemon test.
The primary effect of imposing the suggested duty is to de-
crease the risk of suicide and "deterioration effect" in counselees.
As the above discussion of a duty's burden on the free exercise of
religion indicates, the effect of establishing this duty is not to restrict
the religious content of clergy counseling; religious counselors
would be held to a standard that does not implicate the substance
of counseling. Because the duty requires only that a clergy counselor
recognize his or her limitations as a counselor and advise the coun-
selee to seek professional help, the primary effect would be to
improve professional care for seriously troubled counselees — not
to restrict counselors' religious conduct.
Finally, the duty would not excessively entangle the state in the
affairs of the church. In Lemon, two states' statutes provided sup-
plements and reimbursements to parochial schools for the costs of
secular educational materials, including teachers' salaries. To cal-
culate the amount of money to allocate to each school, the states
were required to distinguish between secular and religious subjects
and materials, to monitor courses' contents, and to examine church
schools' financial records. These determinations, the court held,
resulted in excessive entanglement because they forced the states
to establish a complex, ongoing surveillance of church schools. 2"3
Unlike Lemon, requiring that clergy counselors meet a standard
of care would not excessively entangle the church with the state. 2"
The suggested standard of care does not result in the same degree
of entanglement because it does not require any state examination
241 Nally II, 194 Cal. App. Sc! at — 240 Cal. Rptr. at 230-31.
24 ' Nally 11, 194 Cal. App. 3d at —, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
242 Nally III, 4 7 Cal. 3d at	 763 P.2d at 970, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 119 (1988) (Kaufman,
J., concurring).
149
	 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
241 See id. at 616.
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of financial records or determination or the difference between
secular and religious counseling content. In addition, imposing a
duty of care does not require continuous, or even temporary, mon-
itoring of clergy counselors. The state need only be involved in
religious affairs to the extent that courts must evaluate evidence
before them to determine whether a clergy counselor in fact rec-
ognized a serious mental disorder, found him or herself not com-
petent to treat it, and referred the counselee to a professional
therapist:2 °5 Consequently, state involvement with churches is not
as complex and ongoing as that in Lemon. The court in Nally II
agreed that the narrowly tailored nature of a duty of care like the
one suggested here was further evidence that the state would not
have to monitor religious organizations. 20  Thus, applying the Lemon
test, the above duty of care would not violate the first amendment's
establishment clause.
The proposed licensing that reinforces the above duty by re-
quiring basic education in mental health from any one of a wide
variety of programs is constitutional also. Licensing does not violate
the freedom-to-believe aspect of the free exercise clause or the
proscription on state inquiry into the truth or falsity of an individ-
ual's belief. The suggested licensing requirement ensures that clergy
counselors who proclaim competence to treat serious mental ill-
nesses can at least identify those illnesses and their symptoms. It
does not constrict the content of clergy counsel by directing a clergy
counselor to adopt or abandon a particular religious belief. Simi-
larly, because licensing does not inquire into the content of counsel,
no evaluation of the truth or falsity of a clergy counselor's beliefs
is necessary during the licensing process. Therefore, the free ex-
ercise clause's absolute protection From regulation of religious belief
does not block the imposition of the proposed licensing require-
ment.
Nor would this licensing requirement violate the first amend-
ment's qualified right to freedom of religious conduct. Under the
Sherbert test, the burden of licensing on clergy counselors would not
be substantial if framed as suggested here. The number of clergy
affected by licensing would be limited to those who hold themselves
out as competent to treat serious mental illness. In addition, the
education requirement would be minimal, so a wide range of pro-
grams in mental health would qualify. Unlike the burden in Lemon,
2" See Nally 11 194 Cal. App. 3d at	 240 Cal. Rptr. at 230-31,
206
 Id. at 	  240 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
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licensing would not force a clergy member to choose between reli-
gious counseling and his or her livelihood, or amount to a similarly
severe financial penalty. Therefore, the burden on clergy counselors
would not be substantial.
Yet, if courts considered the burden substantial, the licensing
requirement would still pass the Sherbert test because the state in-
terest in protecting counselees from the destructive effects of neg-
ligent counseling is compelling. It outweighs the clergy -counselor's
right to practice his or her religious beliefs without restriction. In
Sherbert, the state interest did not outweigh the substantial burden
on religious practice because that interest was merely to minimize
fraudulent unemployment claims. In contrast, the state's goal in
implementing a licensing requirement is to protect the mental
health, and, indeed, lives of counselees. The actual, and often se-
vere, harm that research has identified as resulting from negligent
or untrained counseling has elevated the state interest in protecting
counselees from such counseling. As a result, the state's interest
outweighs even a substantial burden on religious practice.
Furthermore, if licensing statutes allowed clergy counselors to
select from a range of training programs, there would be no less
intrusive way to ensure clergy counselor competence. Licensing
limited to counselors professing their competence to treat all forms
of mental illness, and requiring them only to acquire a minimal
level of education, does not restrict clergy counseling any more than
necessary to achieve the compelling state interest. Therefore, the
licensing requirement presented here would not violate the free
exercise clause's limited protection of religious conduct.
Moreover, requiring clergy counselors to meet a minimum ed-
ucational requirement if they hold themselves out as competent to
treat serious mental illness does not violate the establishment clause
under the Lemon test. Licensing has a secular purpose and a pri'mary
effect that does not promote or inhibit religion. In addition, it does
not excessively entangle the state with religion. 207 The purpose of
licensing, like that of the suggested duty of care, is secular: to
protect the growing number of people who seek help from the
serious harm that negligent counseling, can cause. The purpose is
not to support or•undermine religious practice.
The primary effect of licensing would be an increase in the
number of skilled counselors, not the promotion or inhibition of
2" See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
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religion. Certainly a requirement that clergy counselors be licensed
in no sense tends to promote religion. Granted, a licensing require-
ment inhibits religion more than a duty of care; there will be a
slightly greater burden on clergy counselors who want to counsel
people with serious psychological problems. Nevertheless, this slight
burden's effect is ameliorated by several factors. The educational
requirement is minimal and therefore relatively easy to satisfy. Re-
searcherS have found that training has a measurable positive effect
on counseling outcomes. Furthermore, many clergy counselors rec-
ognize that it is in their own and their counselees' best interests to
obtain as much training as possible. Therefore, because the pro-
posed educational requirement is lenient, positive outcomes are
documented, and many religious counselors have recognized the
need for increased training, the primary effect of a licensing re-
quirement would be better counseling, not the inhibition of religion.
Finally, licensing certain clergy counselors would not excessively
entangle the state with religion. Although it would to some extent
involve the state in religious matters, that involvement does not
reach the entanglement level that the Court described in Lemon. In
Lemon, the states had to assess and continue to monitor the content
of courses and materials and the financial records of church schools.
Licensing will not require a similar ongoing relationship between
church and state. No initial or continuing examination of churches'
or clergy counselors' financial records would be necessary to license
those counselors. In addition, once the state makes the initial de-
termination that a clergy counselor has acquired the necessary level
of education, the state's involvement with that counselor ends.
Moreover, state licensing of certain clergy counselors is unlike
the excessive entanglement of Lemon because licensing does not
require the state to evaluate the content of each clergy counselor's
counsel. In Lemon, the statutes forced states to determine, with
individualized scrutiny, whether course materials and content were
secular or religious in nature. In contrast, licensing does not neces-
sitate distinguishing between religious and secular counseling. The
state simply has to process applications by matching the education
a particular clergy counselor has received to a list of courses and
programs that the state has found to provide the minimal mental
health education required: In fact, state administration of a licen-
sing program would • be involved primarily with determining which
educational programs provide that requisite level of training. Thus,
a minimal licensing requirement does not result in an excessively
entangled relationship between church and state because licensing
1216	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 3011179
would not require ongoing surveillance of religious activities, or
state determination of what constitutes religious versus secular
counseling.
The proposals in this note also conform to the recognized tort
principle that a special relationship betWeen a therapist and patient
creates a duty of care that the former owes the latter, especially
when the counselor holds him or herself out as competent to treat
a counselee with severe psychological problems. Yet one court's
decision is contrary to this principle.'" Because that decision ne-
glects the reasoning underlying analogous duties and misconstrues
the absence of a causal connection, it is poorly conceived. In Nally
III, the California Supreme Court held that a clergy counselor does
not owe a duty of care to his or her counselees because no special
relationship exists between counselor and counselee.209 In so hold-
ing, the Nally III court distinguished Tarasoff v. Regents of University
of California on the basis of the precise duty at issue in that case.
Tarasoff involved a psychiatrist's duty to protect others from a pa-
tient, not to prevent a patient from harming himself. The Nally III
court also distinguished Bella'', v. Greenson, explaining that the psy-
chiatrist in Bellah was liable for malpractice, not for violating a duty
of care based on his special relationship with his patient. 21 ° Thus,
the Nally III court found no precedent for the precise duty of care
pleaded by the Nallys.
The Nally III court, however, ignored the reasoning essential
to the holdings in both Bellah and Tarasoff. In Tarasoff, the specific
duty was to protect third parties, but the basis for that duty was the
special relationship that the court held to exist between therapist
and patient.2" Furthermore, the BeWilt court declared that the spe-
cial relationship between a psychiatrist and his or her patient is
clearly recognized by the law. 212 Thus, both courts agreed that a
special relationship exists between psychiatrist and patient, and that
it forms the basis for the creation of duties of care.
Furthermore, the duty of care proposed here conforms to this
accepted tort principle. As the concurrence in Nally III noted, the
basis for the special relationship between therapist and patient is
208 See generally Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 7(33
P.2d 948. 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988).
209 Nally III, 47 Cal. 3d at	 763 P.2d at 960, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 109-10 (1988).
21 " Id. at 	 , 763 1'.2d at 958, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
2 " Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435, 131 Cal. Rptr, 14, 24. 551
P.2d 334, 345 (1976).
212 13ellah v. Greenson, 81 Cal. App. 3d 614, 620, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535, 538 (1978).
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the patient's vulnerability and dependence on the therapist. In the
relationship between clergy counselors who profess competence to
treat mental illness and their counselees, the concurrence asserted,
counselees are both vulnerable and dependent. 2 " Therefore, an
analogous special relationship exists between certain clergy coun-
selors and their counselees, and that relationship should create the
analogous suggested duty of care. Yet the Nally III court's decision
disregarded this reasoning. After finding no precedent for the exact
duty asserted by the Nallys, the court overlooked the special rela-
tionship between therapist and patient that was the basis of prior
courts' decisions. Consequently, the court was wrong to conclude
that clergy counselors have no special relationship with their coun-
selees and therefore owe them no duty of care.
The Nally III court also erred in its consideration of the cau-
sation element in that case.'`' After the majority determined that
no duty of care existed, it ruled that none should be created. In
reaching that conclusion, the court relied almost exclusively on the
lack of causal connection between the clergy counselors' actions and
Kenneth Nally's death. Tenuous causation, the court determined,
was good enough reason not to create a duty of care. As the con-
currence explained, the majority was correct to find that the coun-
selors did not proximately cause Nally's death but incorrect to con-
clude that a lack of causation precludes the imposition of a duty. 2 "
The fact that Nally's counselors tried to help him by encouraging
him to seek psychiatric treatment, the concurrence reasoned, indi-
cated that they met their duty of care — not that they never had
one.2 " Thus, the majority mistakenly ruled that it should create no
duty, rather than rule that a duty based on a special relationship
existed and had been met.
In determining whether to create a duty of care, the majority
in Nally III also examined the public policy issues behind imposing
such a duty on clergy counselors. The court concluded that even a
minimal duty imposed on the clergy would have a "chilling effect"
on both counselors and counselees. 2 t 7 The court reasoned that those
who need counseling the most would be reluctant to seek it out or
fear that their confidential discussions with a clergy counselor would
21" Nally HI, 47 Cal. 3d at _ 763 P.2d at 968, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 117,
sia See id. al -, 763 P.2d at 958, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
21" Id. at	 763 P.2d at 967. ti.7, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 116, 11.7.
216 Id. at	 763 1&2d at 964, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 113 (Kaufman, J„ concurring).
217 See id. at 
	
, 763 P.2d at 959, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 108; Nee also Ericsson, Clergy
Malpractice: Ramificalions of a New Themy, 16 VAL. U.L. Ray. 163, 174 (1981).
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lead to involuntary commitment to a psychiatric institution. The
Nally III court also determined that holding clergy members liable
for negligent counseling would discourage "private assistance ef-
forts." 2 "
Despite the Nally III court's fears, the duty of care and licensing
proposed here would not have a chilling effect on clergy counselors,
their counselees, or "band-aid" counselors because they require no
confidentiality breaches, grant no power to commit con nselees in-
voluntarily, and do not apply to the private assistance efforts men-
tioned by the Nally III majority. The suggested duty is to advise and
persuade a counselee to seek the help of a professional therapist.
It does not require the counselor to notify third parties of a coun-
selee's condition. Therefore, the duty and licensing do not force
disclosure and thereby discourage counselees from communicating
with clergy counselors in the first place. 219
In addition, the fear of involuntary commitment is unlikely to
deter people from seeking help from clergy counselors. Counselees
are already subject to involuntary commitment in limited situations.
The suggested duty to refer does not increase the possibility of
commitment; that power is not given to clergy counselors. There-
fore, the possibility of involuntary commitment is no greater than
it already is for those seeking help from secular counselors. More-
over, the statistics indicate that such a fear has yet to deter people
from seeking secular therapy. 22°
Nor would the duty or licensing proposed deter clergy coun-
selors from continuing to help their counselees. The clergy have
spent over twenty centuries devoted to counseling. They feel acutely
aware that they have a moral obligation to help troubled individuals
with their psychological and spiritual problems. 221 In addition, the
licensing and duty of care proposed here would not restrict clergy
counselors from using their spiritual training to help their counse-
lees or force counselors to undergo prohibitively rigorous training.
Because the con nselee would receive better treatment, and the
counselor would be minimally burdened, the duty of care and li-
censing suggested would not deter the clergy from maintaining
their commitment to helping their counselees.
2" See Nally	 47 Cat. 3d at 	 , 7113 P.2(1 at 959, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
20 See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 441, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 27,
551 P.2d 331, 347 (1976).
220 See generally H. CLINEBELL, supra note 2, at 47-48.
221 Id. at 47.
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Finally, the licensing and duty suggested here would not dis-
courage less formal, stop-gap forms of counseling. The duty and
licensing would only apply to those counselors who establish a spe-
cial relationship with their counselees by holding themselves out as
r:..ornpetent to treat those counselees' serious emotional problems.
The proposed duty and licensing requirement do not expose coun-
seling hot lines and other such services to liability because those
forms of counseling do not create the requisite special relation-
ship.222 In sum, because the duty and licensing would not force
confidentiality breaches, increase the chances of involuntary com-
mitment, or discourage private assistance efforts, the duty and li-
censing suggested will not keep people from seeking counseling or
prevent the clergy from providing it.
Although it did not find or create a duty of care on any of the
above tort principles, in dicta the Nally III court did indicate that it
would support the duty proposed in this note. In a brief footnote,
the majority asserted that a clergy counselor who held him or herself
out as a professional thereby acquired a duty of' care. 223 The ma-
jority did not explain why the facts of the case did not trigger this
duty. In his disagreement, Judge Kaufman was more forthcoming.
The concurrence stated that the facts were sufficient to establish
such a duty, considering that the ministers themselves had engaged
in formal counseling and had written a guide to religious counsel-
ing, which proclamed their proficiency in treating any type of emo-
tional problem. In fact, Nally was aware of the defendant's asser-
tions because he had read that guide and taken a course in
counseling from one of the defendants. Thus, the facts indicated
that the defendants had held themselves out as professional thera-
pists. Even though the court concluded without explanation that
the defendants had not done so, it did recognize that, on different
facts, the very duty suggested here should be established. This too
indicates that the proposed standard of care conforms to recognized
tort doctrine:22'
Thus, the duty of care suggested in this note conforms to
established tort principle better than the holding in Nally III does.
The Nally III court failed to recognize that a duty existed in that
case because the established special relationship between therapist
222 See Nally III, 47 Cal. 3d at	 763 1).2(1 at 969, 253 Cal. Rpt.r. at 118 (Kaufman,
J., concurring).
223 Id. at	 763 1).2(1 at 961 n.8, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110 n,8,
2" Id. at	 763 1',2d at 969, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 118 (Kaufman,,., concurring).
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and patient is closely analogous to that between clergy counselor
and counselee. Moreover, the court resisted creating a duty based
on its misinterpretation of tenuous causation and superficial ex-
amination of public policy. Finally, in dicta, the court itself recog-
nized that a duty such as the one proposed here did not contravene
accepted tort doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
Neither tort doctrine nor the first amendment prevents courts
from holding members of the clergy liable for negligent counseling.
Furthermore, the public interest in preventing the serious harm
that untrained and negligent counseling can cause has increased as
our society relies more and more on the curative force of counsel-
ing. This public policy supports imposing a duty of care on clergy
counselors. In order not to violate the first amendment, recognized
tort doctrines, or the public interest in not deterring the clergy from
counseling, courts should require religious counselors who profess
expertise in mental health to do three things. Courts should require
them to identify symptoms of mental illness, recognize the limits of
their competence to treat counselees who have those symptoms,
and, when they reach those limits, to advise counselees to seek
professional medical treatment. In addition, the Constitution allows,
and public interest dictates, that states establish licensing for clergy
counselors that reinforce the above duty by requiring those coun-
selors to learn the basics of mental health, and when and how to
refer. With licensing and a duty of care, counselees will be safer,
and clergy counselors will be more successful at the cure of souls.
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